External effects of the war in Ukraine: the impact on the price of oil in the short-term by Garzón Gordón, Antonio José & Hierro Recio, Luis Ángel
International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 9 • Issue 2 • 2019 267
International Journal of Energy Economics and 
Policy
ISSN: 2146-4553
available at http: www.econjournals.com
International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, 2019, 9(2), 267-276.
External Effects of the War in Ukraine: The Impact on the Price 
of Oil in the Short-term
Antonio Jose Garzon Gordon*, Luis Angel Hierro Recio
University of Seville, Spain. *Email: antoniojgarzon@gmail.com
Received: 15 November 2018 Accepted: 05 February 2019 DOI: https://doi.org/10.32479/ijeep.7380
ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the short-term impact of the most relevant events of the war in the Ukraine on the price of oil. In order to determine the events to 
be studied, we propose a methodology based on a study of the news published in two reference newspapers in the markets: The Wall Street Journal and 
the Financial Times. From this selection, we use an event study model to detect the significance of the events. The main results obtained are: Events 
that affected daily oil prices were scarce and occurred during very specific phases of the conflict; West Texas intermediate price was more affected 
than Brent, even though the war took place in Europe; there is no noticeable lagged effect in the events, suggesting that the market assimilated the 
impact of relevant events very quickly.
Keywords: Oil Price, War, Ukraine, Event Study 
JEL Classifications: F51, G14, Q40
1. INTRODUCTION
Wars can have a number of effects on the economies of the 
countries involved. They can affect economic growth (Hoeffler 
and Reynal-Querol, 2003), the provision of production factors 
(Ghobarah et al., 2003; Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol, 2003; Biswas, 
2000), the production structure (Mendershausen, 1940), the public 
budget and public debt (Collier, 1999).
Wars can also impact on the economies of third countries directly 
involved, causing external effects in these countries. These 
usually entail two types of effect: On the one hand, direct effects 
on third countries, usually neighbouring countries, with whom 
the countries affected have important relationships, and which 
are usually impacted by large-scale migratory flows (Ghobarah 
et al., 2003; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Salehyan, 2008) and 
substantial changes in commercial relationships (Mendershausen, 
1940; Glick and Taylor, 2010; Ianchovichina and Ivanic, 2016); on 
the other, indirect external effects that spill over into international 
markets when one or more of the countries involved in the conflict 
is important enough to alter the equilibrium in international, 
financial or commodity markets, either directly or by influencing 
their fundamentals (Brune et al., 2015; Rigobon and Sack, 2005; 
Schneider and Troeger, 2006).
One of the latter effects includes the impact wars have on oil prices, 
when one of the countries involved is a major player in the market. 
These wars lead to what is known as “external shocks” in the oil 
market, which increase oil prices either because of a disruption in 
supply or because of a rise in preventive demand (Coleman, 2012; 
Kilian, 2009; Kilian, 2014). They also lead to greater volatility 
during the conflict, resulting from the uncertainty and instability 
that affects the market (Zhang et al., 2009).
In addition to the conflicts linked to the “Arab Spring” (Libya and 
Syria), recent years have also witnessed war in Europe, the civil 
war in Ukraine, in which Russia, one of the world’s leading oil 
producers (BP, 2017), was involved.
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The crisis in Ukraine started on 23 November 2013, when 
Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich turned his back on a 
trade deal with the EU and negotiated a $15 billion bailout with 
Russia. This led to three months of protests in the country, which 
culminated in the overthrow of Yanukovich on 22 February 2014. 
Russia considered it an illegitimate coup, refusing to recognize the 
new government and deploying troops in the Crimean peninsula, 
where a referendum for secession was held on 16 March, with 
secession being declared the next day followed by annexation 
to Russia. Hostilities began on 15 April in the eastern regions of 
Donetsk and Lugansk between pro-Russian armed groups and 
forces of the interim Ukraine government. In June 2014, the war 
intensified, with Russia becoming increasingly involved in the 
conflict. The armed confrontation continued until 5 September, 
when the different parties involved signed a ceasefire agreement 
known as the Minsk Protocol, which has remained in force until 
today apart from sporadic clashes.
Apart from the initial uncertainty it sparked, this war led to 
sanctions being imposed on Russia by western countries, led by 
the USA and the EU, and which was reflected in bans on weapons 
exports, oil extraction technology exports and access to financial 
markets (Davis, 2016). As for its effect on oil prices, a recent study 
concluded that although the war in the Ukraine had no direct effect 
on oil prices it did affect it through a shift in strategic reserves 
(Garzon and Hierro, 2018), with some countries increasing their 
reserves due to their concern regarding how the war might impact 
on the oil market.
The aim of this paper is to provide further insights into how the war 
in the Ukraine indirectly impacted on the price of oil by analysing 
the effect which the most relevant events to occur during the war 
had on daily oil prices. We employ an event study methodology, 
used in the oil market to analyse the short-term impact of OPEC 
announcements and decisions as well as US Strategy Petroleum 
Reserve announcements (Demirer and Kutan, 2010; Lin and 
Tamvakis, 2010; Schmidbauer and Rösch, 2012). The method is 
also commonly used in studies of financial markets.
The main problem we find when applying this methodology to 
analysing the effects of war is that wars are continuous events in 
which, apart from outbreak and end of the conflict, it is difficult to 
determine the relevant events. To solve this problem, we develop 
a system for identifying days when relevant events take place, by 
analysing news from two reference newspapers for international 
markets in the USA and Europe; the Wall Street Journal and the 
Financial Times, respectively.
The method involves selecting days on which relevant events 
occurred, applying two criteria: Firstly, there must be news on the 
front page referring to the war in the Ukraine and in which Russia, 
the relevant country in the oil market, is mentioned. Secondly, even 
if the first criterion is not met, there is news that refers to embargoes 
or sanctions. Furthermore, we also include the formal ceasefire, 
with the signing of the Minsk Protocol, although strangely enough 
this failed to appear on the front page of either newspaper. As a 
result, we obtain a total of 22 days with relevant events for the West 
Texas intermediate (WTI) market and 23 days for the Brent market.
Having identified these particular events, we apply an event study 
with a market model that includes the Bloomberg commodity 
index, a synthetic index which shows the development of 
commodity markets, as an instrumental variable.
The main results we obtain are: Firstly, few events from the war in 
the Ukraine had an impact on daily oil prices, which is consistent 
with the results of Garzon and Hierro (2018); secondly, the WTI 
price was more affected by these events than Brent prices, despite 
Brent being the benchmark price in western European markets, in 
other words closer to where the war was being waged; and thirdly, 
there is no substantial lagged effect in the events studied, suggesting 
that the market quickly assimilated the impact of the events and 
that said impact did not persist even in the very short-term.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
revises the existing literature. Section 3 discusses the data and 
methodology. Section 4 reports the estimation results and section 
5 contains our conclusions.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The existing literature on the impact of wars on oil prices includes 
a number of works that seek to identify effects both during and 
after the wars, that is, in the long-term, whereas other studies aim 
to reflect only the effects during the course of the war. The former 
group includes the work of Kilian (2009), who studies the impact of 
war on oil prices through a vector autoregressive model, including 
oil price, oil production and a proxy for global real economic activity 
as endogenous variables. In the model, three types of shocks are 
analysed: Crude oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks and 
oil-specific demand shocks. The latter reflects oil price changes 
sparked by precautionary demand changes due to uncertainty or 
market concern about future supply disruption. This work looks at 
wars fought between 1973 and 2005 (Iranian Revolution in 1978-79; 
Iraq-Iran war in 1980-88; Persian Gulf War in 1990-91; civil unrest 
in Venezuela in 2002 and the Iraq War in 2003). Results suggest 
that supply shocks have smaller and transitory effects on oil prices, 
whereas increased demand, both aggregate and precautionary, 
triggers a more intense and persistent effect on oil prices over time.
The same method appears in Kilian and Murphy (2012), where 
sign restrictions are imposed. Kilian and Lee (2014) and Kilian 
and Murphy (2014) also use this method, including global and US 
crude oil stock, respectively, as endogenous variables, in order to 
pinpoint the possible role played by speculation in the episodes 
studied. Results from both studies are similar and confirm that 
the effects of wars on oil prices are more related to increased 
precautionary demand than to supply disruptions.
Zhang et al. (2009) employ an empirical mode decomposition 
based-event model to study the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and the 
Iraq War in 2003. This method involves decomposing the oil price 
time series into so-called intrinsic mode functions with different 
time scales, which allow a distinction to be made between short-
term and long-term oscillations. Findings are similar for the two 
wars. Oil prices climb when the war breaks out, remain high 
during the course of the conflict, and then return to pre-war levels 
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when it is over. Increased volatility is also in evidence during the 
war. Finally, by studying the residuals of the model, the authors 
conclude that long-term oil prices are higher than pre-war levels. 
The only difference lies in the intensity of the effects, since the 
results suggest that the Persian Gulf War had a greater impact on oil 
price than the Iraq War, because the Iraq War had been anticipated 
and discounted by the market before its outbreak.
The second group of studies includes Coleman (2012), who studies 
a period spanning 1984 to 2007, which encompasses the Iraq War, 
the Kuwait invasion, civil unrest in Venezuela and the military 
attack in Nigeria in 2006. Ordinary least squares (OLS) using 
White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard error estimator is 
employed. In addition to the fundamental variables, a group of 
dummy variables is included which take a value of one during the 
course of the events mentioned above. Overall, results suggest that 
these events led to an increase in the price of crude oil.
Ji and Guo (2015) analyse the short-term impact of the Libyan 
War on the price of oil. Their aim is to identify the period during 
which the war impacted on prices. For this purpose, they create 
an index of public concern about the war, based on searches in 
“Google Trends.” Using this index, they pinpoint the period of 
the Libyan war when public concern about it reached its height, 
namely between 20 February 2011 and 2 May 2011. For this 
period, they estimate the cumulative price increase. According 
to the results, prices rose by 10% during the period in question.
Finally, in their work into oil prices during the Great Recession, 
Garzon and Hierro (2018) include the effects of the wars in Libya, 
Syria and the Ukraine, employing a vector error correction model. 
For the wars in Libya and Syria, they use dummy variables which 
take the value one for the first 3 months. In the case of the war 
in the Ukraine, the dummy takes the value for the whole period, 
from the outbreak to the ceasefire. According to the results, none of 
the conflicts had a direct effect on oil prices. In the case of Libya, 
however, there is an indirect effect through the drop in OPEC 
production as a result of a disruption in Libyan oil production and, 
in the case of the Ukraine, increased OECD oil stocks, which might 
have indirectly affected changes in oil prices. These increased 
stocks would not have been triggered by underlying changes in 
fundamentals, but rather by greater uncertainty, which would have 
led countries to boost their reserves in order to hedge in the face of 
the war’s possible future impact caused by Russia’s involvement.
This overview highlights one of the flaws still inherent in analyses 
of how wars affect oil prices, namely the lack of studies that 
explore the immediate effects on daily changes in prices. In the 
case of oil prices, event studies, which are very common for other 
markets, remain scarce and always focus on OPEC decisions or 
meetings (Lin and Tavakis, 2010, Schmidbauer and Rösch, 2012), 
as well as announcements from the US strategy petroleum Reserve 
(Demirel and Kutan, 2010). The present paper aims to fill this gap.
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
In summary form, our goal is to analyse how the main events of 
the war in the Ukraine impacted on the daily price of crude. To do 
this, we adopt a two-stage approach: First, we define a method to 
identify a selection of standout events from an on going situation, 
in this case the war in the Ukraine, before then applying an event 
study model that allows us to pinpoint which events impacted on 
the price of oil and in what sense.
The key problem involved in our objective is to make an unbiased 
selection of days in which standout events of the war in the 
Ukraine occurred, in other words those which could have affected 
the behaviour of actors in the oil market. As noted previously, 
Ji and Guo (2015) employ the “Google Trends” search for the 
term “Libya War” to reveal public concern for the Libyan War. 
However, the result is a continuous index, since their aim is to 
identify when this war influenced oil prices, not to pinpoint the 
key events.
Much the same is true of the method designed by Li et al. (2017), 
and which seeks to transform economic news into variables 
that reflect market sentiment. They use news from “investing.
com” to create these market sentiment indicators, which are also 
continuous variables, and apply them to study the extent to which 
they anticipate oil price changes in the oil market. Obviously, 
this method does not enable us to identify standout events either.
Faced with this limitation, we propose a new method to select days 
on which relevant events occurred in the war in the Ukraine that 
might have had an impact on the oil market. For this purpose, we 
use the news published in the press during the conflict, between 
Table 1: Days where there is news about the Ukrainian war in the wall street journal and the financial times between 1 
November 2013 and 30 September 2014
Sample Wall street journal Financial times
Analysed days 334 334
Days with news of the war on the front page 86 70
Days with Russian new on the front page 55 47
Selection 21 21
Source: Authors’ compilation
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the variables
Statistics WTI Brent BCI
Mean −0.000239 −0.000556 0.000234
Median 0.00019 −9.43E-05 −7.93E-05
Standard deviation 0.011956 0.008539 0.00515
Maximum 0.027387 0.021171 0.016547
Minimum −0.059864 −0.022826 −0.014471
Skewness −0.855725 −0.017354 0.053809
Kurtosis 6.484335 2.793891 3.411252
Jarque-Bera 143.7896*** 0.416833 1.724276
Source: Authors’ compilation. *Statistical significance at the 10% level, **Statistical 
significance at the 5% level, ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. WTI: West Texas 
intermediate
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the outbreak and the ceasefire. Unlike Li et al. (2017), our study 
focuses on a political event, a war. We therefore feel that the 
best references may be found in the general media, particularly 
newspapers seen as reference publications for the economic agents 
involved in financial markets: The Wall Street Journal and the 
Financial times.
Although the North American and European oil markets are closely 
linked, we felt that because the war in the Ukraine was fought on 
European soil there might be differences, both in terms of relevant 
events and their consequences. For this reason, we conducted a 
two-fold study such that, in order to pinpoint events that affected 
the WTI price, we use news from the Wall Street Journal and, in 
the case of Brent, news published in the Financial Times.
We study the news from both newspapers in the period spanning 
1 November 2013-30 September 2014, a total of 334 days, 
analysing their content and selecting days where the terms 
“Ukrainian war” or “Ukraine” appear as front page news, either 
in the headline or the main body, and then, inside these groups, 
news that included the terms “Russia” or “Russian,” given that 
the potential influence of this war on the oil market is related with 
Russian involvement in the conflict. The results from this first 
selection are shown in Table 1.
From this group of selected days, we removed those in which the 
reference to the war in the Ukraine and to Russian involvement 
were not mentioned in the same piece of news. Secondly, in order 
to avoid distortions, when there are consecutive days that meet the 
criteria considered a relevant event, we select the 1st day.
We add to the selected days those where, despite not fulfilling 
the first criterion mentioned above, sanctions against Russia were 
imposed, which are a relevant economic fact in themselves, since 
they reflect the spread of the conflict to other areas. We also add 
the day the ceasefire was signed, since although curiously it failed 
to make the front page in either of the newspapers in question, it 
would obviously have influenced oil prices given that it creates 
a new scenario. Finally, we remove from the sample those days 
where oil price data is not available.
The hypothesis we propose regarding the behaviour of oil price vis-
à-vis the selected key events is that these should have influenced 
oil prices, by causing them to rise more than what are normal 
market variations. We employ an event study approach to test this.
As already pointed out, this method has been employed to analyse 
the short-term impact of OPEC announcements and decisions 
concerning production and US Strategy Petroleum Reserve 
announcements on oil price. Lin and Tavakis (2010) estimate the 
abnormal returns of oil price as the differences between the real 
returns and the expected returns in the period considered, which 
in this work is deemed equal to zero. They use it to calculate 
the average cumulative abnormal returns in the event window, 
which covers ten days prior to the event and ten days after it, and 
then construct a test statistic to ascertain the event’s significance. 
Schmidbaur and Rösch (2012) employ a simple regression model 
and a GARCH model, introducing a series of dummy variables 
which represent OPEC meetings, distinguishing between those 
which announce an increase in production quotas, a cut or no 
change.
In addition to OPEC decisions, Demirel and Kutan (2010) also 
analyse US Strategy Petroleum Reserve announcements. In order 
to estimate the abnormal return of oil price, they employ three 
different models (a market model, an ARCH model and a Fama-
French model), taking the residuals as the abnormal returns in all 
of them. In an effort to check the significance of the events, they 
use a test statistic created from the average cumulative abnormal 
return in the event window, 20 days before and after the event. In 
their study, they distinguish between five types of events: OPEC 
announcements of an increase in production, a reduction, and no 
change, as well as US Strategy Petroleum Reserve announcements 
of increases or reductions in strategic oil reserves.
Our model is determined as follows:
As regards the abnormal return of oil price, we defined it as 
follows:
Source: Energy Information Administration
Figure 1: West Texas intermediate price returns (%) in the period 
spanning November 01, 2013–September 30, 2014
Source: Energy Information Administration
Figure 2: Brent price returns (%) in the period spanning November 01, 
2013–September 30, 2014
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  ARet=Ret-E(Ret) (1)
Where ARet is the abnormal return in time t, where e indicates a 
single event. Ret is the normal price return in time t and E(Ret) is 
the expected return, assuming that the event had not taken place.
We set a 1-day event window, firstly because events in wars tend to 
be dramatic and therefore lead to impulsive actions, and secondly 
because wars are ongoing events, such that a larger than one-day 
event window might lead to overlaps between the different events, 
the effects of which might even be of a different sign. A third 
reason is because the oil market is exposed to numerous types 
of shocks, such that increasing the event window might lead us 
to mix the impact of the events studied with the impact of other 
factors, since we do not start from events that have a long-term 
impact on oil price. However, we also employ a two-day event 
window, including the event day and the day after the event, in 
order to check for a possible lagged effect in price related to the 
events studied.
In order to estimate abnormal return, we opted for a market event 
study approach, including, as a proxy variable, a commodity 
index similar to the one used in Demirel and Kutan (2010) where 
the Dow Jones AIG Commodity Index was applied to represent 
market oscillations.
To estimate the abnormal price return during the event and to 
test its significance, we include a dummy variable for each of 
the key events, as done by Schmidbauer and Rösch (2012). Each 
variable thus allows us to test for the existence of abnormal price 
returns on the day of the event. Other studies (Demirel and Kutan, 
2010; Lin and Tavankis, 2010) estimate the average cumulative 
abnormal return in the event window, calculating a test statistic 
from it to analyse its significance. However, it is not possible to 
employ this methodology in our work due to the short length of 
the event window (1 day).
Finally, we include the lagged dependent variable in the equation, 
as is included in the Falagiarda and Reitz (2015) study of the effects 
of ECB announcements of non-conventional programmes on the 
sovereign default risk premium.
The equation to estimate is the following:
 R R BCI Eventet et t jj
n
t t= + + ++− ∑α β ϕ µ ε1 1  (2)
Table 3: Ukrainian war selected events which meet the criteria in both newspapers
Date Event description WTI return ($) 
event day
WTI return ($) 
2 days cumulative
Brent return ($) 
event day
Brent return ($) 
2 days cumulative
March 03, 2014 Senior US official threaten with 
implementing future economic sanctions 
on Russia for his interference in Ukrainian 
Crisis and the Crimea invasion
2.46 0.76 2.28 0.19
March 06, 2014 UE political leaders discuss potential 
sanctions on Russia. German government 
oppose to implementing hard sanctions, 
whereas Estern’s countries defend tough 
measures
0.07 1.07 −0.16 0.99
March 17, 2014 Crimea vote to secede and join Russia 
in a Referendum, with the support of 
Russia. US and the EU condemned the 
Referendum as illegal and set the first 
round of sanctions on Russian officials
−0.80 0.85 −1.09 −1.29
April 15, 2014* EU foreign ministers condemn the Russian 
operation in the Ukrainian borders and 
ask for the withdrawing of troops. They 
also extend the sanctions list to four new 
Russian officials
−0.35 −0.34 1.42 2.03
April 17, 2014 Ukraine accused Russia of carrying out 
military raid in his territory. BP warns 
European governments of the economic 
consequences of imposing harder sanctions 
on Russia and his oil company Rosneft
0.62 0.64 0.08 −0.02
April 28, 2014* US and the EU extend the scope of 
sanctions to seven Russian officials and 
executives, as well as seventeen Russian 
firms through US visa bans and asset 
freezes. Among those sanctioned are 
Rosneft senior high executive
0.28 0.71 −0.41 0.36
May 08, 2014 President Putin softens harsh tone 
on Ukraine, calling for a delay in the 
independence referendum in the Eastern 
regions and assuring the withdrawal of 
Russian troops from the Ukrainian border
−0.54 −0.74 0.02 0.09
Source: Authors’ compilation. * Selected events according to the second criterion (news about sanctions on Russia) For the purposes of assessing the price variations, bear in mind that the 
average daily variation rate in absolute value for the period is 0.86 dollars for WTI and 0.72 dollars for Brent WTI: West Texas intermediate
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Where BCIt is the bloomberg commodity index, a proxy variable 
that represents the development of commodity markets. Through 
this variable, we try to estimate the normal progress of oil price, 
since, in the short-term, its variations are mainly caused by 
changes in the financial and commodity markets. Rt−1 is the lagged 
dependent variable. Eventt is a group of dummy variables with 
which we try to obtain abnormal oil price returns during the events 
studied. These variables represent the previously highlighted 
events, taking the value one for the day of the event (or for the day 
of the event and the day after in the case of a 2-day event window) 
and 0 for the rest of the period. In addition, in the WTI estimation, 
we include a dummy to control for three unusual values which 
appear on the following days: 2 January 2014, 22 April 2014 and 
2 September 2014. These unusual values are not related to events 
that occurred in the war and might distort the estimation results.
All the variables employed in this work, with the exception of the 
dummy variables for events, are expressed in logarithm changes, 
since the interest of our work lay in price returns, not absolute 
values. The variables therefore show daily proportional changes.
As pointed out, the dependent variables of the model are the main 
benchmark prices in the oil market: The WTI, referred to in the 
model as WTI, which is the benchmark in the American oil market; 
and Brent, referred to in the model as Brent, which is the benchmark 
price in the European oil market. The data for both variables are 
provided by the US Energy Information Administration.
The proxy variable, BCI, takes its values from the Bloomberg 
Commodity Index, a synthetic index that charts the price of 24 
different commodities from seven groups, including crude oil. 
Given that developments in financial markets in recent years 
have led to the financialization of commodity markets, thereby 
increasing the volume of investment in the commodity index, 
there is a greater correlation between the different commodity 
prices (Tang and Xiong, 2012). This allows us to employ BCI as 
a proxy for market movements, since it captures the returns in oil 
prices that are triggered by changes in the commodity market and, 
therefore, are not caused by specific changes in the oil market. The 
data is compiled from the website “investing.com.”
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
model. Even though the WTI and Brent are very similar, there are 
some differences in their behaviour. Brent shows less variability 
in the period studied, reflected in a smaller standard deviation, as 
well as in a maximum and minimum of smaller magnitude.
Both show negative skewness, meaning that falls in oil prices 
prevail over increases during this period. Figures 1 and 2 show 
the evolution of both prices and clearly evidence that WTI 
displays more unsteady behaviour than Brent, and undergoes 
more noticeable downturns at specific moments. This makes it 
even more necessary to perform the estimates separately, rather 
than by an aggregate price index.
Table 4: Ukrainian war selected events which meet the criteria only in the wall street journal
Date Event description WTI return ($) 
event day
WTI return ($) 
2 days cumulative
February 28, 2014 Ukraine former president, Yanukovich, ask for protection and help to Russia 
government. US Secretary of State, John Kerry, ask Russia not to interfere in the 
conflict and to respect its border with Ukraine
0.20 2.76
March 10, 2014 Russia president shows his support for Crimea secession. Crimean official, 
supported by Russia, claims that the region could join Russia in a month
−1.43 −2.53
March 21, 2014 US Extend the sanctions to the inner circle of Putin. The EU meet to agree on 
future sanctions
0.29 0.37
March 31, 2014 John Kerry, US Secretary of State and his Russian counterpart meet to address 
the Ukranian issue, without reaching any agreement, increasing the política 
crisis. Kerry remark that Russia does not ensure the withdrawal of its troops, 
settled on the border with Ukraine
−0.16 −2.04
April 10, 2014 Ukranian officials denounce the operation of Russian agents in Eastern of 
Ukraine. Russian government deny any interference in the Ukrainian situation. 
Top finance officials from the G-7 meet to consider new sanctions on Russia
−0.18 0.13
April 23, 2014 Joe Biden, Vice President of the US warns to withdraw his troops from Ukraine, 
whereas Secretary of Defence of the US officials describe a plan to send 600 
soldiers to Ukraine as NATO members with the aim of controlling the Russian 
operations
−0.22 0.51
July 08, 2014 Putin ignore the requirement to send troops against Ukrainian forces by the 
Ukranian separatists
−0.13 −1.26
July 23, 2014 US intelligence officials detected a surface to-air-missile launch in the 
separtist-controlled area in Eastern Ukraine and that there has been a growing 
flow of weapons from Russia to separatists over the last month
−0.78 −1.83
August 08, 2014 Russia bans imports of a wide range of US and European foods in respond to 
penalties impose on Russia over the crisis in Ukraine
0.27 0.75
August 29, 2014 Kiev again accuses Russia of sending troops to Eastern Ukraine to fight for the 
Ukrainian separatists, removing any hope of a diplomatic solution and provoking 
the imposition of new sanctions by US and the EU
1.42 −3.52
Source: Authors’ compilation. For the purposes of assessing the price variations, bear in mind that the average daily variation rate in absolute value for the period is 0.86 dollars for WTI 
and 0.72 dollars for Brent. WTI: West Texas intermediate
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4. RESULTS
Applying the process of determining major events, as described 
above, the key moments selected for the war in the Ukraine are 
shown in Tables 3-5.
Before carrying out the model estimation, we examine the 
stationarity of the variables. To do this, we use the following unit 
root tests: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, the Phillips-Peron test 
(PP) and the Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin test (KPSS). 
The first two tests set as the null hypothesis the existence of a unit 
root, whereas in the last the null hypothesis is the stationarity of 
the time series. Results are shown in Table 6, and all the variables 
are stationary, enabling us to carry out the model parameter 
estimation by OLS.
We perform the estimation for the daily data of the selected 
variables for a period spanning 1 November 2013–30 September 
2014. Results for both WTI and Brent are shown in Tables 7 and 
8, respectively. We observe that crude oil price shows a negative 
relationship with its lagged values, meaning that the price exhibits 
a mean reversion, where returns in the following period offset 
previous returns. However, this parameter is not significant for the 
Brent price. Furthermore, the relationship between oil price and 
BCI, which represents the development of the commodity market 
and is employed to reflect normal changes in crude oil price, is 
positive and significant, as expected.
As regards standout events, we notice that very few of these 
impacted on oil prices in the short-term and that those which did 
do not concur for the two benchmark prices. On the one hand, 
Brent, the European benchmark price, shows an abnormal return 
with a one-day event window on the following days: 3 March 
2014, corresponding to the first threat of sanctions being imposed 
on Russia by the US; and 15 April 2014, which coincided with 
EU condemnation of Russian intervention in the Ukraine and 
Table 5: Ukrainian war selected events which meet the criteria only in the financial times
Date Event description Brent return ($) 
event day
Brent return ($) 
2 days cumulative
February 27, 2014 Russia put armed forces on alert in a show of military strength over the 
political direction of Ukraine. John Kerry, US Secretary of State warns Russia 
that any sign of intervention will be unacceptable for US
−0.85 −0.41
March 20, 2014 UK urges EU to discuss a new energy security plan to reduce the dependence 
from Russian natural gas, increasing the imports from another sources like US 
or Iraq
−0.22 1.25
May 02, 2014 Ukraine’s interim prime minister say that the country is entering its most 
dangerous 10 days since independence in 1991 and acusse Moscow of 
conspiring to promote more clashes and help pro-Russian separatists
0.85 0.85
May 13, 2014 US and the EU prepare new sanctions on Russian economy and discuss a ban 
of exports of high-tech energy equipment if Moscow is seen to have disrupted 
Ukraine’s presidential elections on May 25
0.41 1.50
June 06, 2014 G-7 leaders prepare to impose tougher sanctions against the Kremlin unless it 
halts its provocations inside Ukraine and convince pro-Russian rebels to lay 
down their arms
0.78 2.12
July 14, 2014 Russian government accuses the Ukrainian military of killing one of its citizens 
in the border and warns of irreversible consequences. NATO leaders plot cyber 
fightback after Russian propaganda coup
−1.04 −1.04
August 06, 2014 Russia increase the number of troops on the Eastern border of Ukraine, 
increasing fear of an invasion. Russia demand a humanitarian mission in 
Eastern Ukraine, where pro-Russian are being attacked
1.35 1.20
August 13, 2014 Russian government send a humanitarian aid convoy to rebel-held city 
of Lugansk. Ukrainian government refuses entry to this convoy, since it’s 
considered as an attempt to enter Ukrainian territory by Russia
0.59 −0.53
August 22, 2014 Oil company Rosneft loose a $2bn deal with Vitol due to sanctions imposed by 
the EU and US Ukraine claim to have captured two Russian troops carriers in 
Ukrainian territory
−0.19 0.21
August 26, 2014 NATO chief comment that Russian humanitarian convoy could be a guise to 
distract the west from a build-up of regular Russian forces in Ukraine
0.01 −0.09
September 03, 2014 UE diplomat considers to sanction Russia by boycotting 2018 football World 
Cup, among other sporting events
0.67 1.00
Source: Authors’ compilation. For the purposes of assessing the price variations, bear in mind that the average daily variation rate in absolute value for the period is 0.86 dollars for WTI 
and 0.72 dollars for Brent. WTI: West Texas intermediate
Table 6: Unit root tests
Variable ADF P-value KPSS PP P-value
WTI −16.2549*** 0.0000 0.2028 −16.25788*** 0.0000
Brent −14.9897*** 0.0000 0.2579 −14.9886*** 0.0000
BCI −13.1209*** 0.0000 0.594064** −13.2316*** 0.0000
Source: Author’s compilation. *Statistical significance at the 10% level, ** Statistical significance at the 5% level, *** Statistical significance at the 1% level. ADF: Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller, WTI: West Texas intermediate
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with further sanctions being imposed on high-ranking Russian 
officials. Both events show an increase in oil price. In the case of 
the WTI price, traded in the US, the significant events are: 17 July 
2014, corresponding to the sanctions imposed on Russian firms 
by the US; 25 July 2014, when the EU imposed further sanctions 
on Russian officials and firms; and 31 July 2014, corresponding 
to the third round of sanctions imposed on Russia by the US and 
the EU. In the case of the first two events, an increase in oil price 
is observed, whereas in the latter case the abnormal return shows 
a sharp fall.
Only on 05 September 2014 did the reactions of the two markets 
coincide. This was the day on which the ceasefire was signed 
in Minsk and when a price reduction occurred which the model 
detects as an abnormal variation for both WTI and Brent.
The estimation results show one peculiarity for 31 July 2014 when 
news about forthcoming sanctions, which should be followed by 
an increase in oil price, in fact caused it to drop. It should be borne 
in mind that news about the Ukraine coincided with important 
domestic news from the US concerning the shutdown of a major 
refinery in Kansas due to a fire. The plant consumed 115,000 
barrels per day and its closure would have sparked an adjustment 
in demand and led to an understandable fall in oil price this day. 
It should be remembered that dummy variables in event study 
approaches capture the abnormal return on the day studied, but 
do not detect the source of this abnormality. It therefore seems 
reasonable to consider that the drop in oil price that day was not 
related to the war but to the oil refinery fire.
In comparative terms, the events caused by the war in the Ukraine 
had a greater effect on WTI price, quoted in the US market, than 
on Brent, despite the fact that the war was waged in Europe. 
However, in general, we are not able to assert that the war in the 
Ukraine had any major impact on oil prices other than at specific 
moments that coincided with the US and EU acting against Russia.
To test the estimates and to enable the model to reflect a possible 
lagged effect, we extended the event window to two days. Results 
are also shown in Tables 7 and 8. For the WTI price, the relevant 
events of the one-day event window estimation remain, although 
their significance and impact on price diminish. In addition, a new 
relevant event is added on 23 July 2014, coinciding with the US 
request for Russia to withdraw its troops from the border, although 
it is seen to have little effect and a negative impact on price. In the 
case of Brent, only the event which occurred on 15 April 2014 is 
maintained from the one-day event window estimation. However, 
the following days are added: 20 March 2014, corresponding to the 
EU proposal to reduce Russian natural gas imports; 6 June 2014, 
corresponding to fresh sanctions being prepared by the G-7 group; 
and 31 July 2014, although these latter two have little significance.
This reappears on 31 July 2014, again with a fall in oil price, which 
we understand to be in line with what was explained above, such 
Table 7: Impact of relevant events of Ukrainian war on WTI price
1 day event window 2 days event window
Variable Coeficient P-value Variable Coeficient P-value
WTI(−1) −0.156835*** 0.0030 WTI(−1) −0.241283*** 0.0000
BCI 1.03595*** 0.0000 BCI 1.04575*** 0.0000
28-February −0.0040 0.6585 - - -
03-March 0.0129 0.1559 03-March −0.0016 0.8074
06-March −0.0112 0.2228 06-March 0.0006 0.9336
1-0-March −0.0071 0.4324 10-March −0.0099 0.1359
17-March −0.0016 0.8628 17-March 0.0040 0.5439
21-March 0.0033 0.7118 21-March 0.0011 0.8736
31-March 0.0004 0.9634 31-March −0.0063 0.3454
10-April −0.0046 0.6082 10-April 0.0012 0.8588
15-April 0.0008 0.9275 15-April −0.0011 0.8697
17-April 0.0008 0.9315 17-April 0.0037 0.5741
23-April −0.0084 0.3580 23-April −0.0044 0.5128
28-April 0.0020 0.8279 28-April −0.0008 0.9089
08-May −0.0017 0.8552 08-May −0.0003 0.9609
08-July −0.0003 0.9751 08-July −0.0032 0.6351
17-July 0.018903** 0.0376 17-July 0.014635** 0.0296
21-July 0.0133 0.1425 21-July 0.0067 0.3159
23-July −0.0119 0.1872 23-July −0.012219* 0.0667
25-July 0.01963** 0.0308 25-July 0.013821** 0.0382
31-July −0.056952*** 0.0000 31-July −0.034845*** 0.0000
08-August 0.0062 0.4954 08-August 0.0042 0.5232
29-August 0.0131 0.1465 29-August 0.0050 0.4937
05-September −0.016323* 0.0720 05-September −0.011626* 0.0817
Control −0.033249*** 0.0000 Control −0.034801*** 0.0000
R2 0.4952 R2 0.4559
Adjusted R2 0.4333 Adjusted R2 0.3922
Jarque Bera 2.8251 0.2435 Jarque Bera 2.3757 0.3049
Breush-Godfrey 0.3316 0.7182 Breush-Godfrey 0.4687 0.4944
Breush-Pagan 0.4604 0.9880 Breush-Pagan 1.953629*** 0.0068
Source: Author’s compilation. *Statistical significance at the 10% level, **Statistical significance at the 5% level, ***Statistical significance at the 1% level, 
WTI: West Texas intermediate
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that the effect of the refinery fire would have hit Europe with a 
one-day lag. However, the increase in the number of significant 
events in the two-day event window for Brent might indicate that 
the Brent price reacts more slowly to events than the WTI.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
The aim of this paper is to study the impact of the war in the 
Ukraine on the price of oil as a result of Russia’s involvement 
and, in particular, to go beyond previous studies and to examine 
the very short-term effects of certain relevant events that took 
place during the conflict by defining a method to pinpoint specific 
standout incidents from an ongoing event such as a war. We 
do this by analysing public news on the front page of the Wall 
Street Journal and the Financial Times, as well as news referring 
to sanctions. This allows us to isolate 33 days during which the 
aforementioned newspapers paid close attention to the conflict 
and to Russia’s involvement, highlighting 22 days for the WTI 
market and 23 for the Brent market, 12 of which coincided. Having 
pinpointed the events, we employ a market model event study with 
a one-day and a two-day event window with a proxy variable, 
the Bloomberg Commodity Index, and introduce the key events 
through dummy variables.
As regards the results obtained, it can first be said that key events in 
the war had little impact on oil prices, and were generally confined 
to the times when Russia and the US were involved. This result is 
consistent with the findings of Garzon and Hierro (2018). Despite 
Russia’s involvement, at no time did the conflict compromise the 
country’s oil supply, and the effects were restricted to changes 
in market agents’ expectations which, at most, affected strategic 
reserves, as the cited study suggests.
As for events that affected price, we see that in the European 
market the relevant events that had a major impact occurred in 
the early days of the war, while in the US the relevant events took 
place a few months before the ceasefire. One possible explanation 
for this difference is that the European market initially reacted 
because of its geographical proximity to the conflict and its 
possible spread, while the US market, distant from the warzone, 
would have reacted to events that were less related to the war and 
more linked to the US and the EU’s relationship with Russia as 
well as sanctions imposed due to the war.
When we include the two-day event window, we see that the 
impact of relevant events is less in both markets. In other words, 
the events impact on the same day, given the general trend of the 
market to correct daily oscillations as evidenced by the negative 
sign of the coefficient of the lagged price. In relation to this issue, 
it should be remembered that we are dealing with highly volatile 
markets, exposed to many internal as well as external shocks, and 
which cause any fresh information to quickly exhaust the effect 
of the previous information, such that it is difficult to grasp what 
effect an event has if we extend the window.
Table 8: Impact of relevant events of Ukrainian War on Brent price
1 day event window 2 days event window
Variable Coeficient P-value Variable Coeficient P-value
Brent(−1) −0.0256 0.6820 Brent(−1) −0.0748 0.2360
BCI 0.6382*** 0.0000 BCI 0.6655*** 0.0000
27-February −0.0065 0.4082 27-February −0.0025 0.6599
03-March 0.0149* 0.0608 03-March −0.0022 0.6932
06-March −0.0064 0.4208 06-March 0.0038 0.4916
17-March −0.0057 0.4656 17-March −0.0049 0.3782
20-March 0.0060 0.4522 20-March 0.0112** 0.0470
15-April 0.0163** 0.0390 15-April 0.0116** 0.0394
17-April −0.0015 0.8525 17-April 0.0014 0.8017
28-April −0.0022 0.7836 28-April 0.0008 0.8843
02-May 0.0065 0.4098 02-May 0.0038 0.5003
08-May 0.0021 0.7884 08-May 0.0033 0.5575
13-May 0.0032 0.6853 13-May 0.0066 0.2391
06-June 0.0056 0.4795 06-June 0.0094* 0.0946
14-July −0.0093 0.2344 14-July −0.0028 0.6227
17-July 0.0056 0.4728 17-July 0.0055 0.3238
21-July −0.0029 0.7141 21-July 0.0041 0.4589
25-July 0.0095 0.2282 25-July 0.0045 0.4209
31-July −0.0114 0.1490 31-July −0.0107* 0.0587
06-Auguest 0.0084 0.2858 06-Auguest 0.0056 0.3175
13-Auguest 0.0089 0.2612 13-Auguest 0.0011 0.8503
22-Auguest −0.0009 0.9085 22-Auguest 0.0022 0.6877
26-Auguest −0.0017 0.8247 26-Auguest −0.0010 0.8551
03-September 0.0076 0.3312 03-September 0.0074 0.1827
05-September −0.0172** 0.0290 05-September −0.0068 0.2216
R2 0.2517 R2 0.2489
Adjusted R2 0.1600 Adjusted R2 0.1568
Jarque Bera 1.4049 0.4954 Jarque Bera 0.2429 0.8856
Breush-Godfrey 0.3804 0.6841 Breush-Godfrey 0.7875 0.4564
Breush-Pagan 0.5337 0.9676 Breush-Pagan 1.6108** 0.0388
Source: Author’s compilation. *Statistical significance at the 10% level, **Statistical significance at the 5% level, ***Statistical significance at the 1% level
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As regards volatility, we see that the WTI price evolves in a 
more unstable manner than the price of Brent, evidencing that 
the significant impacts pinpointed were greater in the case of the 
WTI, even though the war took place in Europe.
In sum, the work presented allows us to explore further the external 
effects of the war in the Ukraine on oil prices during the 2014 
conflict, with results consistent with previous works, and proposing 
a novel methodology to identify relevant events within an ongoing 
situation such as a war, and which enables us to expand the use 
of the event study method.
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